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The French Fillon reform of 17 January 2003 unified the schemes of payroll tax reductions for firms 
that had adopted the 35-hour work week and those that had not. This reform had very different effects 
depending on the category of firms concerned: the payroll tax reductions was considerably greater for 
the firms that had remained on 39 hours than for the others, particularly for wages situated at around 
1.3 times the minimum wage). This article examines in detail the nature of the reform and its effects on 
wages  and  labour  costs,  before  presenting  an  evaluation  of  its  impact  on  employment,  using  a 
balanced  panel  of  firms  with  more  than  5  employees  drawn  from  a  matching  between  several 
administrative data sources for the period 2002-2005.  
In both categories of firm, we find elasticities of employment with respect to labour costs that are 
significant and of the expected signs: a rise of 1% in average labour costs reduces employment by 
0.25%. As the majority of 39-hour firms received greater reductions, the Fillon reform allowed them 
to  raise  their  level  of  employment.  For  the  35-hour  firms,  on  the  contrary,  the  reverse  situation 
prevailed: the reform led to a fall in employment. Ultimately, the Fillon reform has had no clear effect 
on aggregate employment, measured either in job numbers or full-time equivalents. It has, however, 
contributed to a rise in average wages, for both categories of firms.  
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In order to tackle unemployment, payroll tax reduction targeted on low wages have been 
implemented in many countries, especially in Continental Europe countries where a minimum 
wage coexists with high employer-paid payroll taxes. These cuts have been experienced since 
July 1993 in France and in Belgium and since 1994 in the Netherlands with the SPAK policy 
(Specifieke  Afdrachtskorting  Lage  Lonen).  Through  many  reforms  since  1993,  the  French 
policy has been extended to more and more workers far away from the mandatory minimum 
wage  within  a  fast-growing  budget.  Since  the  last  2003-2005  reform  which  has  been 
implemented when Mr François Fillon was France's Minister of Labor, the tax cut affects 
merely two thirds of the labor force and costs 25 billions euros per year, which represents 1.3 
percent  of  GDP.  With  the  Fillon  reform,  this  payroll  tax  reduction  has  become  the 
masterpiece of the employment policy in France with the largest budget among European 
Countries policies dedicated to that type of policy and also the largest budget among French 
programs for employment. 
The Fillon reform merged two previous payroll tax reduction. The first one was the low wage 
tax cut (LWTC) implemented by Mr Balladur and Mr Juppé between 1993 and 1998. The 
second one was the working time reduction tax cut (WTRTC) experienced by Mr Jospin and 
Mrs Aubry since 1998 within the context of the 35 hours work week policy. The Fillon reform 
has kept the linear profile of the LWTC and the starting point of the WTRTC, i.e. the 26 
percentage points tax cut at the minimum wage. The main originality was to introduce a new 
threshold of 160 percent of the minimum wage for the end of the tax reduction. It is important 
to notice that a high minimum wage increase has been concomitant with the Fillon reform. 
However, this rise was lower for 35 hour-firms than for the others.   
This article proposes an evaluation of the effects of this reform on employment and wages by 
using a matching of administrative data, allowing us to verify the amounts by which firms 
actually  benefited  from  reduced  social  security  contributions.  We  start  by  describing  the 
nature and timetable of the shock on the amount of payroll taxes paid by firms, showing how 
the unification of reduction measures has had very different effects depending on the category 
of firms. We then present the data used for our evaluation, which are indicators at the level of 
each establishment. This provides us with information about the amount and nature of the 
reductions  from  which  firms  actually  benefit,  whereas  all  previous  studies  have  simply 
ascribed scales. These data allow us to make a certain number of original observations about 
the changes in the situation of firms. After presenting these observations, we evaluate the 
effects  of  the  reform  using  a  balanced  panel  of  more  than  90,000  firms  with  5  or  more 
employees.  
We compare the levels of several variables of interest before and after the Fillon reform, and 
within two groups of firms. The first one adopted the 35-hour work week and benefited from 
WTRTC that have been introduced by laws Aubry 1 and 2. The second one had retained a 39-
hour work week and benefited from the LWTC. For each group of firms, we examine the way 
in  which  a  stronger  reduction  in  payroll  tax  between  2002  and  2005  influenced  the  total 
labour costs and size of the workforce, total or unskilled. The aim is to evaluate the impact of 
the Fillon reform on employment (total or unskilled), wages and labour costs, in firms that 
had adopted the 35-hour work week and in firms that had stayed with the 39-hour work week. 
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A new evaluation is necessary 
A large number of applied studies have investigated a posteriori the effects of a national 
payroll  tax  reduction  (PTR)  scales.  According  to  these  studies,  there  is  no  clear  relation 
between changes in contributions and changes in wages, employment and unemployment. We 
shall  briefly  describe  the  methodologies  used  and  the  results  obtained  by  these  different 
generations of articles.  
The first  generation of  studies was based on time series  (Brittain, 1971; Vroman, 1974a; 
Beach and Balfour, 1983; Kugler and Kugler, 2008) or international comparisons (Vroman, 
1974b;  Bell  and  Nickell,  1997).  These  first  works  obtained  heterogeneous  results  on  the 
effects of a modification in PTR on employment. These results have been largely challenged 
in recent years because of their high dependence on bias due to omitted variables. Indeed, at 
the macroeconomic level, these unobserved variables can  affect the rates of contributions 
observed  and  at  the  same  time  wages  and  employment,  thereby  biasing  the  estimated 
coefficients.  
To surmount this problem, a second generation of works drew on microeconomic data. Using 
this approach, based on US panel data from the PSID for the period 1968 - 1974, Hamermesh 
(1979) showed that a rise in PTR influences wages and employment at the same time. A 1% 
rise in PTR was accompanied on average by a 0.3% drop in wages, the remainder being 
absorbed by a fall in employment.  
Adopting  a  similar  methodology,  Gruber  (1997)  studied  the  overall  influence  of  the 
privatisation of the Social Security system in Chile, introduced in 1981 and resulting in a 
substantial cut in PTR. Using data on manufacturing firms for the period 1979 - 1986, he 
obtained the result that  only wages were positively  affected by this shock. The effect on 
employment remained non-significant.  
Using French data, Kramarz and Philippon (2001), and Crépon and Desplatz (2001) analysed 
the impact of the LWTC during the 1990s linked to the Juppé reform of 1995. Based on data 
from the French Labour Force Survey for the period 1990 - 1998, Kramarz and Philippon 
(2001) analysed the probability of losing their job for two groups of employees: those directly 
affected by the change in labour costs, and those not directly affected, but who are closest to 
the first group in the wage distribution. With the help of difference-in-differences estimators, 
they  obtained  the  result  that  a  1%  rise  in  labour  costs  leads  to  a  1.5%  increase  in  the 
probability of losing one’s job. With LWTC, the fall in labour costs in the neighbourhood of 
the minimum wage has a positive effect on employment. Crépon and Desplatz (2001) used 
matched employee-employer data for the period 1994 - 1997 drawn from Bénéfices réels 
normaux  (BRN)  and  Déclarations  annuelles  de  données  sociales  (DADS)  to  analyse  the 
effects  of  the  LWTC  reforms  of  1995  and  1996.  With  the  help  of  parametric  and  non-
parametric estimators, they concluded that there was a strong rise in employment following 
the reform (about 600,000 jobs).  
A last generation of studies used time series at the industry level (Jamet, 2005; Gafsi, L’Horty 
and Mihoubi, 2005). The main advantage of this approach is that it takes into account effects 
of  volume  and  inter-industry  substitution.  These  studies  found  an  impact  on  employment 
which is substantially lower than that identified by Crépon and Desplatz (2001), particularly 
for low wages workers. 
These estimations on French datas all concern measures in force up until 1998, representing 
budgets  of  the  order  of  5  billion  euros.  Today,  those  budgets  have  more  than  tripled. 
Consequently, not only are the results of applied econometric studies inconsistent with each  
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other, but they have also been left behind by the rising costs of these measures. Hence, a new 
evaluation of the impact of SSC reductions on employment and wages has become necessary, 
because this policy has been by far and away the leading employment policy in France over 
more than a decade, in terms of both the budget committed to it and the number of employees 
concerned. 
If we investigate the reasons for the lack of evaluation of French schemes for reduced SSC, 
then one main cause emerges, by a process of elimination. Fundamentally, it is neither the 
unavailability nor the inaccessibility of data, neither the will of researchers nor that of the 
economic administration, in the broadest sense of the term, that are to blame. In reality, all 
these factors, and many others that might be named, only play a marginal role. The principal 
cause  resides  in  the  way  these  measures  have  been  implemented.  Since  1993,  we  have 
witnessed no less than eight major reforms of SSC reduction schemes, in other words an 
average lifespan of 18 months. In short, the endemic instability of these measures constitutes 
the main obstacle to their evaluation by means of modern econometric techniques. Over the 
last  fifteen  years,  the  trial-and-error  search  for  an  ideal  formula  for  reductions  in  SSC, 
combined with the massive rise in the cost of the budgets devoted to this policy, have made it 
very difficult in practice to carry out an economic evaluation of it.  
 
Legal framework 
Evaluating the effects of a public policy presupposes a precise and careful definition of the 
shock of which we wish to study the consequences. This means that we must determine not 
only the content of the reform, but also the degree of its actual application in firms and over 
time. That is the purpose of this section, in which we set out to describe precisely the nature 
and chronology of the shock, in order to verify whether the unification of reduction measures 
has had significantly different effects on different categories of firms. 
A multiple reform 
It is often complex to simplify a tax system. The “Law n°2003-47 of 17 January 2003 relating 
to wages, working time and the development of employment”, known as the Fillon reform, 
simultaneously affected several components of labour costs. The minimum wage was raised 
in an exceptional way,  the amount and structure of the payroll tax underwent large-scale 
change, and the laws governing overtime quota were profoundly modified.  
Firstly, the period 2003-2005 saw the harmonisation of six coexisting minimum wages: the 
five monthly wage guarantees (GMR – garanties mensuelles de rémunération) with the level 
of the 39 hour-minimum wage. The French minimum wage introduced in 1970, includes the 
basic  wage,  fringe  benefits,  and  all  other  payments  having  the  de  facto  character  of  a 
premium. The level of the hourly level of the minimum wage is revised every year on July 1
st 
according to inflation, half of any increase in hourly blue collar wage levels and possible 
government extra boosts. When the 35-hour work week was introduced in January 2000, one 
of the principles enshrined in the legislation was a guarantee of the purchasing power of 
employees  earning  the  minimum  wage  and  benefiting  from  the  working  time  reduction 
(WTR). The payment of these employees was determined on the basis of their monthly wage 
before WTR. So the GMR corresponds to the hourly minimum wage at the time of adoption 
of the 35-hour work week multiplied by 169 hours. Employees working a 35-hour work week 
therefore automatically earned a higher hourly wage than the hourly minimum wage for the 
39-hour work week. The five “generations” of GMR applied to employees moving to the 35-
hour work week before July 1
st 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003.   
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These GMR are reviewed on the basis of inflation and half of any increase in monthly blue 
collar wage levels. Thus, before the Fillon reform, the GMR rose less than the hourly 39-hour 
minimum wage. The aims of the Fillon reform was to get the latter and the different GMRs to 
converge upwards over three years.  
As Graph 1 illustrates, over the period 2001-2005, the hourly minimum wage rose by 20.4% 
in current euros, whereas the different GMR rose by between 8.0% and 12.6%. Consequently, 
the increase in labour costs generated by the rise in the hourly minimum wage and the GMR 
was higher for those firms that had retained the 39-hour work week. 
Graph 1   
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Different trajectories for different firms 
Over and above the unification of minimum wages, the main purpose of the reform was to 
harmonise the situations of firms and employees with regard to PTR schemes and minimum 
pay levels in view of the planned abolition of GMR. After enactment of the Aubry laws of 
1998 and 2000, which introduced the 35-hour work week, two measures of PTR co-existed. 
Firms remaining on 39 hours continued to benefit from the LWTC (Ristourne sur les bas 
salaires) implemented by the Balladur reform of 1993 and the Juppé reform of 1996. Firms 
adopting the 35-hour work week enjoyed a more generous system of reduction, to compensate 
for the extra costs linked to the reduction in working hours the WTRTC. For these firms, we 
can distinguish between two main families of incentives to reduce working time: the measures 
known as “Aubry 1” and “Aubry 2”, differentiated by the date of entry, the total and the scale 
of aids.  
Firms that had anticipated the legal change to 35 hours, by reducing the effective working 
hours of their  employees by  at least 10%  and increasing their workforce by at least 6%,  
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benefited from a lump aid per employee and per year that varied between 1,300 € and 752 €, 
depending on the date of the change to the 35-hour work week. In addition, this aid could be 
cumulated during five years with the LWTC measures up until 2000, then with Aubry 2 from 
2000 to 2003, and finally with the Fillon measure from 2003 until July 2004. After this date, 
firms had to choose between the Fillon reductions and the Aubry 1 reductions.   
In order to unify all these different devices, the PTR were merged to produce a single, hybrid 
mechanism that has been in force ever since. Over this period, labour costs have therefore 
evolved  as  a  function  of  three  main  factors:  the  increase  in  the  minimum  wage  and  the 
monthly wage guarantee established with the laws on the reduction in working hours; the 
spread  of  the  increase  in  these  minima  over  all  wages (on  this  point,  see  Koubi  and 
Lhommeau,  2006);  the  PTR  reform.  Other  measures  have  been  added  to  these  changes, 
encouraging the use of overtime or modifying the regulation of part-time work.  
The PTR reform was imposed on all firms. However, the difference in scale was much more 
distinct in firms benefiting from the LWTC, which represented 18.2 % at the level of the 39 
hour minimum wage and decreased linearly to zero at 1.3 times the minimum wage. In three 
successive stages, starting in July 2003, the amount of the reduction was increased to 26 % 
and the range was extended up to 1.6 times the minimum wage (Graph 2-A). The rise in 
reductions was therefore clearly more pronounced in these firms, for all wage levels. This 
relative advantage given to firms retaining the 39-hour work week was intended to offset the 
rise in the gross hourly 39 hour minimum wage. In firms benefiting from Aubry 2, the reform 
only marginally modified the amount of reductions for low wages, but cut reductions for 
medium and high wages (Graph 2-C). The replacement of a convex scale by a linear scale 
meant that there was no change at the level of the minimum wage, a reduction in contributions 
up to about 1.6 times the minimum wage and an increase of about 2 percent above this wage 
level. For firms benefiting from Aubry 1, who had hitherto received the most aid at all wage 
levels,  the  harmonisation  of  scales  resulted  in  lower  reductions  at  all  wage  levels  and 
especially for the highest levels, because of the disappearance of flat-rate aids (Graph 2-B). 
 
Progressive implementation  
One  particular  difficulty  in  the  evaluation  lies  in  the  timetable  of  implementation  of  the 
reform. All these concomitant modifications in labour cost components were implemented 
progressively. Over two years, from July 2003 to July 2005, a large number of successive 
reorganisations  were  carried  out  with  the  aim  of  harmonising  wages  and  payroll  tax 
contributions. For the firms that had retained the 39-hour work week, the new measure was 
adopted in three stages (July 2003, July 2004 and July 2005). For the firms that had adopted 
the 35-hour work week, the transition took place in four stages (July 2003, July 2004, January 
2005  and  July  2005).  The  different  provisional  scales  for  the  different  initial  situations 
(LWTC, Aubry 1-WTRTC and Aubry 2-WTRTC) are shown in Graphs 2A, 2B and 2C.   
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Graph 2 
Amount of monthly reductions per employee 
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Source: Legifrance 
Note: This graph is based on the assumption that firms benefit from the highest level of reductions (i.e. 1372 euros the first 
year)  
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Graph 3 shows the distribution of the weight of reductions over the different PTR schemes for 
each year. From 2002 to 2003, LWTC coexisted firstly with Aubry 1-WTRTC and then with 
Aubry 2-WTRTC. From 2002, the weight of these two measures reached 70% and overtook 
mostly  LWTC. Transitory regimes appeared from 2003 until 2005, before being replaced by 
the definitive mechanism. 
Graph 3 
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Sources: Acoss-Urssaf (2005) – calculations by the authors  
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Overall, these changes have resulted in a redistribution of the PTR between firms, with less 
given  to  firms  on  35  hours  and  more  to  those  on  39  hours.  However,  within  these  two 
categories of firms, the strength of the positive or negative shock varied according to the 
workforce structure, in terms of wages and skills. Within both categories of firm, the amount 
of the reductions varied greatly from one firm to another.  
First results 
As the shock of the Fillon reform is asymmetrical in terms of both wage brackets and firms, it 
is useful to take this double asymmetry into account in the analysis. This calls for the use of 
specific data, which must allow us to describe wage distributions by firm, while at the same 
time recording the regime of reduction and its evolution over time.  
The data 
In particular, it is necessary to know the number of employees in each wage brackets (defined 
as a multiple of the French minimum wage). To compute these information and various others 
indicators characterising the establishments, we have drawn on Insee data from an exhaustive 
administrative  files  called  DADS  (Déclarations  Annuelles  de  Données  Sociales  –  Annual  
Declarations of Social Data). We also need information about the nature of the PTR in every 
firm. For this, we have used Acoss files (Agence Centrale des Organismes de Sécurité Sociale 
– Central Agency of Social Security Organisations). The AROME, ORME and SEQUOIA 
databases allow to identify different categories of establishments that benefited from PTR 
over the period 1999 - 2005. This chiefly concerns the low wage rebate, aids associated with 
the  first  Aubry  law  on  the  reduction  of  working  time  and  the  second  Aubry  law  on  the 
adoption of the 35-hour work week, and the two sections of the Fillon reform of 2003 – that 
affecting firms on 35 hours and that affecting other establishments. These aggregate data at 
the level of each establishment comprise the wage bill, workforce numbers, PTR, the number 
of  employees  concerned  by  these  reductions  and  the  payroll  taxes  due  by  establishments 
affiliated to the general social security regime. 
After  matching  of  the  Insee  and  Acoss-Urssaf  databases,  we  obtain  an  original  dataset  
describing the evolution for each wage brackets (defined as a multiple of the French minimum 
wage) the type of aids obtained, the number of employees concerned and the total amount of 
PTR from which the establishment benefits. The matched database is composed of 130,000 
establishments (92,000 firms) employing 3 million employees in full-time equivalents (FTE) 
(table 1). 
Table 1. Database size, second half of 2004 
  Nb of establishments  Nb of employees (FTE)  
Initial Acoss and/or Dads database  1.8  million  establishments 
(1.4 million firms) 
14 million employees 
Initial  Acoss  and  Dads  database  of 
establishments  with  at  least  one 
employee (1) 
688,000 establishments  9.2 million employees 
Base (1) panel from 2002 to 2005 (2)  384,000 establishments  5.9 million employees 
Final database drawn from base (2) for 
firms  with  more  than  5  employees, 
matched with SUSE files and excluding 
extreme values 
130,000  establishments 
(92,000 firms) 
3,0 million employees 
Source: AROME, ORME and SEQUOIA (Acoss-Urssaf) databases, DADS (Insee).   
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The field finally used in the econometric analysis is a balanced panel of private non-farm 
business and semi-public firms for the period 2001 to 2005
2. It corresponds to firms with 
more than 5 employees present simultaneously in Acoss and Insee files and for which the 
main activity of the establishment (APET) is always recorded, excluding temporary agency 
workers, apprentices, trainees and home workers
3 (gross workforce numbers registered on 31 
December). Public establishments (identified by a SIRET number starting with 1 or 2) have 
been excluded from the sample, as have the establishments of firms with no right to PTR 
under the Fillon reform: France Telecom, Orange, La Poste, RFF, EDF, GDF, ADP, SNCF, 
Banque de France, RATP, SEITA. Firms benefiting simultaneously from two types of aid or 
discontinuously, holding firms, domestic service firms, temporary employment agencies and 
public firms have all been excluded. Firms belonging to the Hotels Cafés Restaurants (HCR) 
industry have also been excluded, because they received a specific aid during this period. 
Finally,  firms  in  which  the  growth  rate  of  employment,  production  and  labour  costs  are 
characterised by extreme values
4, and those in which the average gross hourly wage is lower 
than the minimum wage have also been excluded. All these manipulations lead us to exclude 
20,000 of the 150,000 establishments initially present in the sample (Table 1). 
Four categories of establishments 
As the measures of PTR were not always exclusive, establishments may have benefited from 
several in succession. The large majority of establishments in our sample - four out of five - 
have benefited from at least one measure of PTR. The 20% who have not benefited from any 
measure of reduction are establishments that are present in the DADS (Insee) files and not 
present in the ORME (Acoss-Urssaf) files, but which are not excluded from the general field 
of  reductions
5.  Note  that  this  category  tends  to  overstate  the  number  of  “unaided”  firms, 
because it includes some firms that have received aid but are incorrectly identified during the 
matching of the Acoss and Insee files (fictitious or erroneous SIRET numbers). Among the 
establishments that have received at least one aid, four categories can be identified: 
-  Establishments benefitting from the LWTC until 2003 and then from the Fillon PTR. 
They represent more than 65% of establishments aided (and 40% of employees) and 
form the first category (LWTC-Fillon PTR).  
-  Establishments benefitting from the low wage rebate, the Aubry 2 WTRTC and then 
the specific Fillon measure in 2003. They constitute 20% of establishments aided (and 
33% of employees).   
-  Establishments that benefited from Aubry 1 and Aubry 2 WTRTC and then the Fillon 
PTR.  These  “Aubry  1”  establishments  represent  slightly  less  than  10%  of 
establishments aided (16% of employees). 
                                                 
2 The data for 2001 are used to construct lagged values for our indicators.  
3 In the rest of this study, we shall use the distribution of employees by wage brackets (defined as a multiple of 
the French minimum wage). This information is difficult to obtain for very small firms, which is why we have 
chosen the threshold of 5 employees. 
4 We thereby exclude all observations for which the values of the variables in question do not lie between -60% 
and +250%.   
5 The Fillon payroll tax cuts concern employers of the private sector affiliated to the regime of unemployment 
insurance for employees in the general regime, the agricultural regime and the regimes of miners, sailors and 
notary. Certain employers in the parapublic sector are also covered for employees whose jobs are eligible for 
unemployment benefit (e.g. private-public firms, large national firms). On the contrary, private employers, the 
State, local authorities and public administrative bodies are excluded.  
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-  hybrid  establishments,  which  belong  simultaneously  to  these  different  categories, 
which have changed from one category to the other over the course of time, or which 
have received specific aids (extra PTR for a cut of more than 15% in working hours 
and for the road haulage industry). These establishments constitute a more marginal 
category. 
Graph 4 shows the evolution of the distribution of employees in these different categories of 
establishments for all firms (this graph is based on data from the initial database, not the 
balanced panel).  
Graph 4. Distribution of employees in different categories of establishment 
Without PTR
LWTC and Fillon PTR
Aubry1 and Aubry 2 
WTRC Fillon PTR
Only Aubry 1 WTRTC
Aubry 2 WTRC without 
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Source: AROME, ORME and SEQUOIA databases (Acoss-Urssaf), DADS (Insee).  
Field: Firms with 5 or more employees in the private non-farm business and semi-public sectors excluding HCR 
for the period 1999 - 2005.  
Table 2 presents the characteristics of firms according to these different categories, for firms 
present throughout the period 2001 - 2005. On average, the LWTC-Fillon PTR firms have a 
smaller  workforce  than  those  benefitting  from  measures  associated  with  the  WTRTC  (18 
employees compared to 24 for “Aubry1 and Aubry2 WTRTC” firms and 45 for “Aubry2  
WTRTC” firms). Firms on 35 hours are thus more likely to employ more than 50 employees, 
(about 9% for Aubry1 and Aubry2 WTRTC, and 16% for Aubry2  WTRTC, compared to 5% 
for  LWTC-Fillon  PTR). They  are  also  more  unlikely  to  be  very  small  firms  (less  than  10 
employees). In addition, firms that have adopted the 35-hour work week are more likely to 
come from the trade or finance industries. Conversely, firms keeping the 39-hour work week 
are more likely to be in the capital goods industry, building or transport. Lastly, firms on 39 
hours  are  more  likely  to  be  located  in  the  Ile-de-France  or  Rhône-Alpes  regions.  The 
categories of firms in our sample also differ in the composition of their workforce. Compared 
to the firms that remained on 39 hours, those that adopted the 35-hour work week employ a 
larger proportion of unskilled and a lower proportion of skilled labour.   
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Table 2. Characteristics of firms present in the data base for 2002 
 
Aubry1+Aubry2+Fillon  Aubry2+Fillon      Hybrid  RBS+Fillon 
Workforce characteristics  
Average size  23.71  44.89  36.14  18.25 
]5-10[  55.92%  41.31%  46.87  54.65% 
[10-20[  19.65%  21.30%  20.31%  25.74% 
[20-50[  15.57%  21.15%  19.12%  14.51% 
[50-200[  7.47%  12.37%  10.68%  4.44% 
[200 and more  1.39%  3.87%  3.02%  0.67% 
% of unskilled employees  26.0%  21.8%  18.6%  18.7% 
% of skilled employees  42.9%  40.5%  41.4%  48.2% 
% of highly skilled employees  31.1%  37.7%  40.0%  33.1% 
% of part-time employees  17.7%  15.6%  14.6%  13.0% 
% of women  37.1%  33.5%  33.0%  28.4% 
Branches of industry         
Food industry  4.4%  3.5%  3.8%  4.5% 
Consumer goods and car industry  4.4%  4.2%  6.3%  4.1% 
Capital goods industry  3.2%  4.9%  5.8%  5.7% 
Intermediate goods and energy  6.9%  11.6%  11.9%  10.5% 
Building  10.7%  8.4%  9.5%  20.7% 
Trade  44.6%  34.3%  29.7%  29.8% 
Transport  3.4%  4.2%  4.7%  7.5% 
Financial,  real  estate  and  business 
services 
7.6%  16.9%  7.8%  3.3% 
Other services  14.8%  12.0%  20.6%  13.9% 
Wages and working hours         
Average gross hourly wage  13.83 €  16.57 €  16.60 €  15.25 € 
%  of  employees  paid  [0.8;  1.1[ 
minimum wage 
21.9%  9.4%  11.7%  13.9% 
%  of  employees  paid  [1.1  ; 
1.3[minimum wage 
19.1%  14.0%  12.3%  17.9% 
%  of  employees  paid  [1.3  ; 
1.6[minimum wage 
20.0%  20.4%  17.9%  21.4% 
%  of  employees  paid  [1.6  minimum 
wage and more 
34.0%  51.7%  54.4%  44.8% 
Average annual number of hours  1620.84  1680.37  1694.82  1744.37 
Geographical location         
Ile-de-France  8.4%  15.93%  22.38%  18.02% 
Rhône-Alpes  8.96%  11.53%  10.79%  12.77% 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur  8.14%  7.23%  7.46%  6.57% 
Other regions  74.5%  65.31%  59.37%  62.64% 
Number of observations  39 154  57 532  37 968  148 924 
Source: AROME, ORME and SEQUOIA databases (Acoss-Urssaf), DADS (Insee).  
Field: balanced panel of establishments with 5 or more employees in the private non-farm business and semi-public sectors 
excluding HCR over the period 2001-2005.   
On average, firms on 35 hours employed a higher proportion of workers on low wages (less 
than  1.3  minimum  wage)  than  the  others.  This  result  is  principally  due  to  the  firms  that 
adopted the 35-hour work week with the help of Aubry 1 WTRTC. The gross hourly wage is 
lower  in  these  firms  than  it  is  in  those  that  changed  to  the  35-hour  work  week  without  
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incentives or in those that remained on 39 hours. Lastly, and not surprisingly, the number of 
annual hours worked per employee is lower in 35-hour firms than it is in 39-hour firms. It is 
also lower in firms that moved to 35 hours in the context of Aubry 1 than it is in the others
6. It 
is also likely that all these categories of establishments also differ in their characteristics of 
work organisation and technology, as several applied studies on the transition to the 35-hour 
work week have shown (notably Bunel [2005] and Gilles [2006]). 
Clear  differences  in  employment  evolution  between  the  different  categories  of 
establishment 
For  each  category  of  establishment,  Graph  5  shows  the  evolution  in  the  proportion  of 
employees for whom their employer firm receives PTR
7. In the framework of Aubry 1 and 
Aubry 2, firms were granted PTR for all their employees. In the case of the LWTC, only the 
lowest  wages,  below  1.3  minimum  wage,  were  concerned,  represented  some  20  %  of 
employees.  With  the  Fillon  reform,  the  proportion  of  employees  concerned  converged  to 
about 50 %. It therefore fell in firms on 35 hours and rose in those on 39 hours, as can be seen 
in Graph 5. It can also be observed that at the end of this period, the proportion of employees 
concerned was higher in LWTC firms than in Aubry 2 firms, reflecting a higher proportion of 
employees  being  paid  less  than  1.6  minimum  wage  in  LWTC  firms  (see  Table  2). 
Employment  evolution  in  what  we  call  “hybrid”  establishments  was  comparable  to  that 
observed in Aubry 2 firms. 












S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Aubry1 and Aubry2-WTRTC+Fillon PTR Aubry2 WTRTC+Fillon PTR
Hybrid LWTC+Fillon PTR  
Source: AROME, ORME and SEQUOIA databases (Acoss-Urssaf), DADS (Insee).  
Field: balanced panel of 92,939 firms with 5 or more employees in the private non-farm business and semi-public 
sectors excluding HCR for the period 2001 - 2005. 
                                                 
6 Firms  that  wanted to  move to the 35-hour  work  week  with the benefit of  Aubry 1 aids  were obliged to 
implement a 10% reduction in effective working time, unlike other firms. 
7 These are gross workforce figures, not full-time equivalents: an establishment that transforms a full-time job 
into two part-time jobs increases the number of employees concerned by measure involving PTR.  
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Graph 6 shows the evolution in the amount of the reduction per employee concerned for each 
wage  brackets  (defined  as  a  multiple  of  the  French  minimum  wage)
8.  It  is  relevant  to 
distinguish different wage brackets because the aids are regressive with regard to wage. This 
is indeed what we can observe in the Graph 6, where, for all categories of establishment, the 
amount of aid is all the higher when the wages are low. Remember that the Fillon reform sets 
out to harmonise heterogeneous situations, with the result that firms which had adopted the 
35-hour work week did not receive the same treatment as the others. Given the sliding scales 
of reductions, the difference is small at the level of the minimum wage but substantial around 
the level of 1.3 minimum wage and for high wages. We have therefore defined four wage 
brackets in the graph, expressed as proportions of the hourly minimum wage: employees who 
earn an hourly wage close to the minimum wage, those whose wages lie between 1.1 and 1.3 
times the minimum wage, those between 1.3 and 1.6 minimum wage, and those whose hourly 
wage is above 1.6 minimum wage. Before the Fillon reform, the average amount of aid was 
higher in establishments benefitting from the Aubry measures than it was in firms receiving 
LWTR,  for  all  wage  levels.  With  the  Fillon  reform,  these  differing  amounts  converged 
towards one sole level, resulting in a cut in the average amount of aid for establishments on 
35 hours (Aubry 1 and Aubry 2 WTRTC) and a rise in the amount of reductions for LWTR 
establishments. This convergence is visible at all wage levels, varying in intensity from one 
wage bracket to another.  
Graph 6. Amount of PTR per employee concerned for different wage brackets 
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8 Note that the amount of the PTR for each employee is not calculated using Acoss information about these 
employees (EFFREC variable). The use of this variable produces abnormally low estimations of reductions (for 
example, less than 50 € for 39 hour firms before 2002). The numbers of employees affected by payroll tax 
subsidies has therefore been recalculated using Dads data.   
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S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Aubry1 and Aubry2-WTRTC+Fillon PTR Aubry2 WTRTC+Fillon PTR
Hybrid LWTC+Fillon PTR  
Source: AROME, ORME and SEQUOIA databases (Acoss-Urssaf), DADS (Insee). 
Field: balanced panel of 92,939 firms with 5 or more employees in the private non-farm business and semi-public sectors 
excluding HCR for the period 2001 - 2005.  
 
Labour costs, calculated per employee and taking PTR into account, are affected by the Fillon 
reform. They rise more slowly in firms staying on 39 hours than in those changing to 35 
hours.  In  this  respect,  Graph  7  is  most  illustrative.  Before  implementation  of  the  Fillon 
reform, between the first halves of 2002 and 2003, the evolution in labour costs per full-time 
equivalent employee was the same for all categories of firms. Since the first half of 2003, on 
the other hand, labour costs per employee have increased by 4% to 6% for firms on 35 hours, 
while they have only risen by an average of 1% in firms on 39 hours.  









S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
2002 2003 2004 2005
Aubry1 and Aubry2-WTRTC+Fillon PTR Aubry2 WTRTC+Fillon PTR
Hybrid LWTC+Fillon PTR
 
Source: AROME, ORME and SEQUOIA databases (Acoss-Urssaf), DADS (Insee).  
Field: balanced panel of 92,939 firms with 5 or more employees in the private non-farm business and semi-public sectors 
excluding HCR for the period 2001 - 2005.  
Note: base index = 100 for first half of 2003.  
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Graph 8 represents the wage structure in wage brackets (defined as a multiple of the French 
minimum wage) in the different categories of establishment in 2001 and in 2005, from which 
we can deduce its evolution. Overall, the structure has remained stable for firms receiving 
Aubry 1 aids, with just a slight fall in low-wage employees. Establishments on 39 hours, on 
the other hand, experienced a strong rise in the proportion of low-wage employees earning up 
to 1.3 minimum wage, corresponding to the wage bracket in which PTR were highest in the 
Fillon reform. Establishments receiving Aubry 2 aids also saw a rise in low-wage employees, 
but on a smaller scale, and above all a strong fall in the share of high wage earners, above 1.6 
minimum wage, for which the Fillon reform abolished previous PTR. 
The evolution in the level of employment for each category of establishment is presented in 
Graph 9. It can be seen that employment rose regularly in RBS establishments, by a total of 
just over 4% between 2001 and the end of 2005, while it fell during the period of the Fillon 
reform in establishments receiving Aubry 1 and/or Aubry 2 aids. The evolution in hybrid 
establishments was comparable to that of Aubry 2 establishments. This employment evolution 
appears to go in the right direction, given the nature of the payroll tax shocks experienced by 
the two categories of firms (a rise in the average value of reductions for firms on 39 hours and 
a fall for firms on 35 hours) and given the evolution in labour costs (see Graph 7). However, 
this observation needs to be confirmed by econometric analysis to take into account the fact 
that  this  employment  evolution  could  be  explained  by  factors  other  than  PTR  (see  the 
following section).  























Source: AROME, ORME and SEQUOIA databases (Acoss-Urssaf), DADS (Insee).  
Field: balanced panel of 92,939 firms with 5 or more employees in the private non-farm business and semi-public sectors 
excluding HCR for the period 2001 - 2005.  
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S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Aubry1 and Aubry2-WTRTC+Fillon PTR Aubry2 WTRTC+Fillon PTR
Hybrid LWTC+Fillon PTR  
Source: AROME, ORME and SEQUOIA databases (Acoss-Urssaf), DADS (Insee).  
Field: balanced panel of 92,939 firms with 5 or more employees in the private non-farm business and semi-public sectors 
excluding HCR for the period 2001 - 2005.  
The effects on labour costs, wages and employment 
The results given above are essentially descriptive. If we wish to go further, we must use 
econometrics to evaluate the effects of the Fillon reform, ceteris paribus. For this purpose, we 
shall now focus on two main categories of firms. The first is composed of 35 hour firms 
benefited of the WTRTC (Aubry 1 and/or Aubry 1 aids) and obtained Fillon PTR after 2003. 
The second comprises 39 hour firms which received before 2003 LWTR and received “Fillon 
PTR” after. For each group of firms, we study the impact on labour costs, hourly wages, the 
overall employment level and that of unskilled workers, of a variation in the “apparent tax 
cuts  ratio” (ATCR) – the ratio between the amount of PTR received and the labour cost – 
between the second half of 2002 and the first half of 2005. 
To carry out this evaluation, only the firms of which all the establishments were present 
simultaneously in the different files were retained. The final sample is a balanced panel of 
more than 90,000 firms. The field we have chosen is firms with five or more employees
9 
(gross numbers registered on 31 December), present in the sample over the period 2001 to 
2005  and  receiving “Fillon  PTR”  continuously  over  the  period  2003  to  2004  (AROME, 
ORME  and  SEQUOIA  databases  from  Acoss).  The  “hybrid”  type  firms  described  in  the 
previous section are excluded from the analysis. 
A contrasting evolution in the amount of reductions between the two groups of firms 
The amount of PTR for an employee earning the minimum wage was about 300 € in the first 
half  of  2005,  for  both  categories  of  firm.  Likewise,  in  2005,  the  average  reduction  per 
                                                 
9 In the rest of this study, we shall be using the distribution of employees by wage bracket (multiples of the 
Smic) for our analysis. As this information is difficult to obtain for very small firms, we have chosen a threshold 
of 5 employees.   
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employee benefitting from PTR, i.e. earning between 1 and 1.6 minimum wage, was also very 
similar for both categories of firms (around 150 € per month).  
In 2002, on the contrary, 39 hour firms received a payroll tax subsidies of 180 € for each 
employee earning the minimum wage, compared to 280 € for the 35 hour firms. However, the 
average reduction per employee concerned was higher for the first group of firms than it was 
for the other (by about 20 €). This is because although, before 2003, all the employees in 35 
hour firms benefited from reductions, the reductions for employees earning more than  1.7 
times the minimum wage were small (about 50 €). 
To take this change of field into account, we have chosen to use the “apparent tax cuts ratio” 
(ATCR) – the ratio between PTR and the wage base. The latter rose by 2.1 points for 39 hour 
firms, whereas it fell by 0.9 points for 35 hour firms. This difference in evolution is due to the 
narrowing of the field of PTR (abolition of reductions for employees earning more than 1.7 
minimum wage) and the low increase in reduction rates granted to 35 hour firms, while 39 
hour firms have benefited simultaneously from a widening of the field of eligibility and an 
increase in rates of reduction. 
Overall, then, firms remaining on 39 hours have benefited more from the reform than those on 
35 hours. Within each category, however, the reform has had very heterogeneous effects on 
the evolution of the level of PTR. Nearly 90% of the 39 hour firms saw an increase in their 
ATCR, compared to 37% of the 35 hour firms. Moreover, among the firms in the former 
group, 58% were greatly advantaged by the modification in reduction scales, because their 
ATCR increased by more than 0.02 points (Graph 10). Among the firms in the second group, 
33% suffered a fall in ATCR of at least 0.02 points. 
Graph 10. Evolution in the ATCR between 2002 and 2005:  






















































































































































































Différence in ATCR between 2002 and 2005
%
35 hour firms 39 hour firms
 
Source: AROME, ORME and SEQUOIA databases (Acoss-Urssaf), DADS (Insee). 
Field: balanced panel of 92,939 firms with 5 or more employees in the private non-farm business and semi-public sectors 
excluding HCR for the period 2001 to 2005.  
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Econometric methods 
The variations in the ATCR are due to both the change in legal tax cuts rates and to variations 
in employment or in salary mass. To get an unbiased effect of the Fillon reform, we compute 
a « virtual apparent tax cuts ratio » (VATCR). In fact, we follow Crépon and Desplatz (2001) 
who calculate a « virtual » labour cost for every workers in 1997. This methodology allows 
them to estimate the impact of the LWTC reform, independently of any change in wages that 
was observed between 1994 and 1997.  
In our paper, to get a VATCR for 2005, we make use of the Fillon tax cuts scales from 
January  2005 and we apply them to gross wages that are measured in June 2002. We do this  
for eight level of wages
10. Hence, we get variations in the social security payroll tax rates, had 
wages and employment been kept unchanged between 2002 and 2005. In particular, the only 
variables that are supposed to affect the average labour cost are: (i) the level of variables that 
are  observed  in  2002  (average  wage  level  in  the  firm ;  average  wage  within  the  wage 
brackets;  employment level and composition; for the firm: having adopted or not the 35-hour 
work  week);    (ii)  the  changes  induced  by  the  Fillon  reform  (changes  in  tax  cuts  scales; 
increase in the minimum wage or in the GMR). 
Consequently, our goal is to explain employment variation using the variation in the VATCR, 
as well as usual control variables (for instance: firm size, industries, geographical location, 
value added growth rate). The variation in VATCR at the firm level is subject to different 
measurement errors linked to the nature of the data and its processing. To limit the influence 
of these errors, we have chosen as a treatment variable the position of firms with regard to the 
distribution of this variation, distinguishing between different classes, rather than the value of 
the variation in the reduction ratio.  
To test the impact, ceteris paribus, on the variables of interest in the different sub-populations 
of a relative variation in average labour costs, we use three econometric methods: the ordinary 
least  squares  method  (OLS),  the  quantile  regression  method  (QR),  and  propensity  score 
matching (PSM). We shall now briefly present the characteristics of these methods. 
The OLS method estimates the average effect of the treatment consistently and without bias if 
it is exogenous. The model is written in the following form:  
 
where  D D D Dln Yi represents the  growth rate of the dependent variable (employment,  average 
labour  costs  and  hourly  wages),  Xi  a  vector  of  exogenous  variables  that  explain  D D D Dln  Yi 
(industries, geographical location, value added growth rate, etc.) Ti the treatment variable (the 
amount of VATCR) and ui a residual.  
In  addition  to  the  OLS  method,  the  quantile  regression,  first  developed  by  Koenker  and 
Bassett (1978), allows to measure the effect of dependent variables on the estimated variable 
at different points of its distribution, and not just the mean, as is the case for the linear model 
estimated by OLS. This method, now widely used (Koenker and Hallock, 2001), is based on 
the following minimisation programme:  
                                                 
10 These wage brackets are defined as a multiple of the French minimum wage and are the following: workers 
whose wage lies between 0.8 and 1.1 times the minimum wage; between 1.1 and 1.2 times the minimum wage; 
between 1.2 and 1.3 times the minimum wage; between 1.3 and 1.4 times the minimum wage; between 1.4 and 
1.5 times the minimum wage; between 1.5 and 1.6 times the minimum wage; between 1.6 and 1.7 times the 
minimum wage; workers whose wage is larger than 1.7 times the minimum wage. Details about the building of 
the ATCR and about the estimation results are found in (BUNEL et al., 2009).  
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where  q q q q represents the  quantile considered. The estimated parameters  b b b bq q q q and  g g g gq q q q can vary 
according to the quantile in question. In our case, the main attraction of this approach is that it 
allows us to control for the homogeneity of the impact of a variation in wage costs generated 
by the Fillon reform (2003) over the whole distribution of variables of interest. Moreover, it 
allows us to assume residuals not to be normally distributed.   
Finally,  to  relax  also  the  hypothesis  of  linearity  between  the  dependent  variable  and  the 
independent  variables  imposed  by  the  above  two  methods,  we  use  the  method  of 
semiparametric propensity score matching. For each firm, only the situation corresponding to 
the real evolution in labour costs can be observed. The interest of PSM estimation is that we 
can  compare  this  situation  with  another  one  that  would  have  resulted  from  a  different 
evolution in labour costs. For this purpose, we use the kernel matching method developed by 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998). It is based on the construction, for each firm treated 
(e.g. having benefited from a greater increase in PTR), of a counterfactual firm corresponding 
to a weighted mean of all the firms in the control (or reference) group (e.g. of firms having 
benefited from a smaller increase in PTR). The weighting used is determined by the distance 
between  the  score  obtained  by  a  firm  (i.e.  the  probability  that  the  firm  has  been  granted 
greater reductions, depending on its characteristics) and the score of each firm in the control 
group. Initially, the Heckman, Ichimura and Todd estimator (1998) studied the effect of a 
dichotomous  treatment.  However,  it  is  possible  to  extend  it  to  cover  multiple  treatments 
(Lechner, 1999; Brodaty et al., 2000; Frölich, 2004).  
Let  kl
k T C =   denote  the  causal  effect  being  sought,  corresponding  to  the  difference  in  a 
performance indicator Y when a firm has benefited from a variation k in the apparent tax cuts  
ratio as compared to a variation l, with  l k> .  
 
As in all matching models, the problem comes from the fact that  ( ) k T Y E i il =  is not observable. 
The estimated causal effect, used to get around this problem, is written as follows:  
 
k N corresponds to the number of firms benefiting from a variationk in labour costs, and  k T is 
the set comprising these firms.  [.] K denotes a kernel function and  j h  a smoothing parameter, 
fixed at 0.06. The probabilities   are deduced from probabilities estimated using an ordered 
probit model that allows us to calculate  and . We obtain:  
 
Note that these estimators are calculated on the common support, in other words on that part 
of the treated and control firms which are comparable, i.e. on that part of the two propensity 
score  densities  that  is  common  to  both  the  treated  group  and  the  control  group.  Lastly,  
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standard errors and confidence intervals are computed through bootstrapping replicating fifty 
samples with replacement.  
These  three  econometrics  methods  are  used  to  estimate  the  effects  of  a  variation  in  the 
« virtual apparent tax cuts ratio » on employment and on others variables of interest. In order 
to present in a very simple way our estimation results, we have computed the elasticities 
dividing the estimated impact on the interest variable by the labor cost variation induced by 
the Fillon reform, as it was previously describe.  
Results of the estimations  
Tables 3 to 6 present the elasticities of employment and wages with respect to the average 
wage cost that we have estimated for firms on 35 hours and then for firms on 39 hours. 
Following an increase of 1 % in labour costs, these elasticities indicate the effects, in percent, 
on employment (measured in gross numbers and full time equivalence) and wages. Significant 
results are printed in bold type. The elasticities are often significant and always have the 
expected sign. A rise of 1 % in average costs reduces employment by about 0.25 %.  
Overall,  the  results  are  not  very  sensitive  to  the  method  of  estimation.  Propensity  score 
matching (PSM) gives qualitatively comparable results to the parametric approach (OLS). 
The results from quantile regression (QR) suggest that the estimation of elasticities obtained 
by OLS is higher at the lower end of the distribution for firms on 39 hours.  
Now let us look at the results in more detail. To begin with, we consider the group of firms on 
35 hours as a whole, before describing the effects more precisely, by observing what happens 
within  this  group  according  to  the  size  of  the  shock  experienced.  We  then  repeat  the 
procedure for the group of firms on 39 hours. 
Firms on 35 hours 
Overall, in the firms on 35 hours, the elasticities of  employment  with respect to average 
labour  costs  are  more  often  significant  when  employment  is  measured  in  full-time 
equivalents.  The  effects  are  less  noticeable  when  they  are  measured  in  terms  of  gross 
workforce numbers, according to the results shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Estimation of the elasticity of variables of interest with respect to changes in 
average labour costs for firms on 35 hours  
  Quantile regressions  
 
OLS 
25%  50%  75% 

















[-0.4735; - 0.0328] 








Source: AROME, ORME and SEQUOIA databases (Acoss), DADS and SUSE (Insee). 
Field: Panel of 92,939 firms with 5 or more employees for the period 2002 to 2005 in private non-farm business 
and semi-public sectors.  
Notes: *** significant at the level of 1%; ** significant at the level of 5%; (ns) non significant. 
The values between square brackets correspond to the limits of the confidence interval at 95%. 
Moreover, as most of the firms on 35 hours have experienced an increase in average labour 
costs with the introduction of the Fillon reform, the negative sensibility of full-time equivalent 
employment to the shock (-0.28) indicates that one of the reasons for the fall in the volume of  
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hours worked is the increased use of temporary and part-time employment in these firms 
between 2002 and 2005. This effect can be ascribed to the higher end of the employment 
distribution (-0.25 for the third quartile).  
This was to be expected, insofar as the firms on 35 hours have suffered a fall in PTR on high 
wages  (1.7  Minimum  wage  and  above)  with  the  Fillon  reform.  Table  4  shows  that  the 
negative effect on gross employment in 35 hour firms was confined to those firms that had 
experienced a strong rise in average labour costs (between 2% and 3%). As we have already 
pointed out, this impact derives mainly from firms employing high-wage workers: Note that 
in firms experiencing a rise in average labour costs of 2% to 3%, the share of employees 
earning 1.7 minimum wage and more was more than 44%. 
Table 4. Estimation of the elasticity of variables of interest for different values of 
average wage cost increases 
    OLS  Nearest Neighbour  Kernel 
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Source: AROME, ORME and SEQUOIA databases (Acoss), DADS and SUSE (Insee). 
Field: Panel of 92,939 firms with 5 or more employees for the period 2002 to 2005 in private non-farm business 
and semi-public sectors.  
Notes: *** significant at the level of 1%; ** significant at the level of 5%; (ns) non significant. 
The values between square brackets correspond to the limits of the confidence interval at 95%. 
 
The sensitivity of employment to average labour costs appears to increase in absolute terms 
with  the  size  of  the  shock:  it  is  lower  in  firms  where  labour  costs  have  increased  less  
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(sensitivity of -0.45 to -0.36 for a variation lower than +0.5%; on the contrary, sensitivity of -
2.25 to -1.57 for a variation of +2% to +3%). 
Effects on wages are less significant. The significant elasticities tend to be positive. The rise 
in  labour  costs  therefore  appears  to  have  gone  together  with  a  rise  in  gross  wages.  This 
movement  of  wages  in  firms  on  35  hours  is  mainly  associated  with  firms  in  which  the 
increase in average labour costs generated by the Fillon shock was the highest (+1% to +3%). 
Firms on 39 hours 
For the firms that kept the 39-hour work week, Table 5 highlights two main results. Firstly, 
the elasticities of gross and full-time equivalent employment with respect to average labour 
costs  are  indeed  negative  (–0.22  and  –0.31).  As  firms  on  39  hours  experienced  a  fall  in 
average labour costs with the introduction of the Fillon reform, employment grew, both in 
total hours worked and in the number of employees. The strongest growth in employment (in 
employees or hours worked) took place in those firms that had received the highest increases 
in PTR (variation in average labour costs of between -3% and -2%).  
Table 5.  Estimation of the elasticity of variables of interest with respect to changes in 
average labour costs for firms on 39 hours 
  Quantile regressions  
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[-0.2259 ; -0.0261] 
-0.1680*** 
[-0.2980; -0.0379] 








Source: AROME, ORME and SEQUOIA databases (Acoss), DADS and SUSE (Insee). 
Field: Panel of 92,939 firms with 5 or more employees for the period 2002 to 2005 in private non-farm business 
and semi-public sectors.  
Notes: *** significant at the level of 1%; ** significant at the level of 5%; (ns) non significant. 
The values between square brackets correspond to the limits of the confidence interval at 95%. 
Secondly, implementation of the Fillon law of 2003 had a knock-on effect on wages, as it had 
for firms on 35 hours. Here, the elasticity of wages with respect to labour costs is negative 
(about –0.44) and labour costs have fallen overall, meaning that the Fillon reform has indeed 
brought about a rise in wages. These firms employed a high proportion of employees earning 
between 1.2 and 1.7 minimum wage, no doubt influenced during this period by the spread 
effects of successive increases in the hourly minimum wage.  
Net effect on employment 
Broadly speaking, the effect of the Fillon reform on employment has been very weak, or even 
slightly negative. Firms on 39 hours have benefited from it, on the whole, as they have seen 
average labour costs fall thanks to the PTR and despite the rise in the minimum wage. The 
effect of the Fillon reform on these firms has been positive. The firms on 35 hours, on the 
other hand, have experienced a rise in average labour costs, mainly related to the loss of PTR 
for  employees  earning  over  1.7  minimum  wage,  with  the  end  of  the  Aubry  1  WTRTC 
measures, and the increase in monthly wage guarantees (for firms employing 20 or more 
people). This rise in labour costs led to a slight fall in employment.  
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Table 6. Estimation of the elasticity of variables of interest with respect to changes in 
average labour costs for firms on 39 hours, for different values of average wage cost 
increases 
    OLS  Nearest Neighbour  Kernel 
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Source: AROME, ORME and SEQUOIA databases (Acoss), DADS and SUSE (Insee). 
Field: Panel of  92,939 firms with 5 or more employees for the period 2002 to 2005 in private non-farm business 
and semi-public sectors.  
Notes: *** significant at the level of 1%; ** significant at the level of 5%; (ns) non significant. 
The values between square brackets correspond to the limits of the confidence interval at 95%. 
 
We can attempt to specify the order of magnitude of these effects. For 39 hours firms, the 
overall effect on gross employment depends on the average change in average labour costs (-
1.017%) and on the elasticity obtained in Table 5 (-0.2234). This gives us an effect of the 
order of 0.24%, or about 3,000 jobs. Even if we extrapolate this result to the whole active 
population, in other words the 15 million employees in the private non farm sector of which 
46% work in firms on 39 hours, we only obtain an effect on employment of about 15,500 jobs 
created or saved by the Fillon reform. We can carry out a similar calculation for full-time  
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equivalent employment. In this case, the impact on employment is slightly stronger, of the 
order of 4,300 jobs in the sample and 21,500 jobs in the whole population.  
For 35 hours firms, the average change in labour costs was +1.71% (weighted by workforce 
numbers). Given that the elasticity for full-time equivalent jobs is -0.278, the overall effect is 
negative. It is of the order of -0.48%, or the loss of about 7,700 jobs. Extrapolating to the 
whole population (54% of the 15 million employees in the market sector were employed by 
firms on 35 hours), we obtain an effect of 39,000 jobs destroyed.  
So  the  overall  effect  of  the  Fillon  reform,  on  35-hour  and  39-hour  firms  taken  together, 
appears to have been very weak, or even negative. This is an aggregate result for large groups 
of firms, and it is not incompatible with the possibility that the reform has had a significant 
impact for certain firms in a few particular sectors of activity.   
It should be noted that this article adopts an approach of micro-econometric evaluation along 
the lines of Crépon and Desplatz (2001), and is not based on any closed macroeconomic 
system. Our evaluation does not take into account either volume effects or effects of inter-
industry substitution. Moreover, this study does not specify the impact of the Fillon reform by 




The reform introduced with the Fillon law of 17 January 2003 aimed to unify the different 
pre-existing schemes of payroll tax subsidies on low wages. It has had very different effects 
depending  on  the  type  of  firms  concerned.  The  harmonisation  of  the  different  schemes 
produced a much more pronounced reduction in payroll taxes for firms that had not changed 
to the 35-hour work week than for those that had, particularly for employees earning around 
1.3 minimum wage. This observation is still verified when we consider the concomitant rise 
in the minimum wage, even with varied hypotheses about the spread of this rise along the 
wage distribution. Compared to the pre-existing reduction schemes, the Fillon harmonisation 
represented  a  fall  in  labour  costs  targeted  slightly  below  the  median  wage  and  more 
pronounced in firms that had not signed an agreement to move to the 35-hour work week.  
In this article, we use a balanced panel of firms over the period 2002-2005. This period starts 
just before the introduction of the reform, namely 2002, and finishes with the completion of 
the reform, in 2005. We have started in 2002 to avoid interruptions in the DADS chain of 
processing.  The  sample  has  been  restricted  to  a  balanced  panel  because  it  is  difficult  to 
distinguish between the real creation and closure of establishments and entries and exits from 
administrative files. To measure the distribution of employees in each firm, we have limited 
the sample to firms with five or more employees.  
After  presenting  the  nature  of  the  shock  and  the  data  used,  we  distinguish  between 
establishments according to the intensity of variations in payroll taxes during the  reform. 
Through an econometric evaluation, we show that the level of employment grew more in 
those  firms  that  gained  the  most  from  increased  PTR.  Overall,  on  the  one  hand,  as  the 
majority  of  39-hour  firms  benefited  from  increased  reductions,  the  Fillon  reform  led  to 
relative  growth  in  their  level  of  employment.  For  35-hour  firms,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
opposite  situation  can  be  observed.  For  these  firms,  the  reform  led  to  a  relative  fall  in 
employment. Ultimately, because of this effect of redistribution of employment over firms, 
the Fillon reform had no clear effect on aggregate employment, whether measured in gross 
numbers or full-time equivalents.   
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Overall, labour costs decreased, but with notable differences between the two type of firm. 
For those on 39 hours, the Fillon reform resulted in a fall in labour costs, partly offset by a 
rise  in  hourly  wages.  For  firms  on  35  hours,  on  the  contrary,  the  Fillon  reform  had  no 
significant effect on labour costs. Hourly wages tended to fall because  of the increase in 
working hours, and this fall offset the rise in labour costs generated by the loss of some of the 
PTR previously enjoyed by these firms.  
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